• Hazard Identification
A structured and systematic approach to hazard identification is fundamental to any safety assessment. This is typically provided by a A Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP). WE can provide a Chairman or Secretary for studies at every stage of a project and any level of detail.

• Optioneering Studies
The justification that the pappropriate design solution is being pursued is founded in a comprehensive engineering exercise that considers the full range of potential design solutions and assesses them comparatively against defined criteria. This can be conducted either via workshop or desktop exercises, depending on complexity.

• Fault Schedule and Fault Sequence Analysis
The chosen design must be assessed to determine the nature of the faults that may occur and the safety-related outcome from those faults. This requires a systematic analysis of failure modes and the identification of design features or systems that can act to prevent the development of a fault sequence.

• Design Basis Analysis
To demonstrate that the risks from identified fault scenarios are tolerable, an assessment must be made of the likelihood of faults occurring, and the quality and integrity of the safeguards that can be claimed in response to those faults. There must be suitable and sufficient measures in place to meet defined targets relating to the number and quality of safety measures.

• Probabilistic Safety Assessment
In addition to confirming the adequacy of safety measures from a deterministic perspective, it is also a requirement to assess the risk of harm from the plant, process or equipment, taking account of the frequency of faults and the likelihood that the claimed safety measures will not perform their function. Typically this is performed using Fault Tree or Event Tree analysis. Calculated risk levels must be compared against pre—defined targets and limits.

• ALARP Assessment
The principle of As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) is fundamental to the legal regime under which all hazardous activities undertaken within the UK are governed, both nuclear and non-nuclear. There is no straightforward legal definition of ALARP, but an operator or Licensee must consider and implement all available measures to minimise risk unless the cost (in terms of time, effort and money) of implementation of a particular measure can be shown to be grossly disproportionate to the level of risk averted.

• Engineering and Design Substantiation
Whilst the safety case presents an argument that risks are adequately controlled, evidence must be provided that the claims and assertions made within the safety can be substantiated. This requires the detailed assessment of the engineering design in order to confirm that specific safety functional requirements can be met.